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Frank Cramer was a handicapped resident at Auglaize Acres Nursing Home.
Auglaize Acres is a county operated nursing home. Mr. Cramer was completely
dependent upon Auglaize Acres for his care.
In January 2002, Mr. Cramer fell
while being assisted to bed by a Hoyer lift operated by two nurses employed by the
home. Despite the fall policy not to move Mr. Cramer, the two employees moved
him to his bed. Mr. Cramer’s condition was not assessed until five hours after he fell
despite obvious swelling and bruising and his complaints of pain. During surgery to
repair his leg, Mr. Cramer died. Mr. Cramer’s estate sued Auglaize Acres for the
nurses’ alleged negligent acts. Under the Nursing Home Bill of Rights every
resident of a nursing home may recover damages upon a showing that the home or
any person has violated the patient's rights. Mr. Cramer’s codified right to adequate
medical care was violated.
The Ohio Supreme Court held that the Nursing Home Bill of Rights allowed a
cause of action against the home itself, but not against the home’s employees.
Further, the Court found that the Ohio Political Subdivision Act might re-immunize
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the home for those acts of its employees that were discretionary. Residents of a
county home thus do not have the same protections as residents of other nursing
homes when the home happens to be owned by the county—a political subdivision.1
I. INTRODUCTION
Cramer v. Auglaize Acres curtails the protections of Ohio’s Nursing Home Bill
of Rights for nursing home2 residents residing in county owned nursing homes.3
Generally, all nursing home residents are protected by codified rights.4 However, the
Ohio Supreme Court has interpreted the Ohio Political Subdivision Tort Liability Act
to redefine these rights for approximately ten percent of Ohio’s nursing home
residents. Currently, those residents living in government owned nursing homes are
substantially less protected from the tortious acts or omissions of the nursing home’s
employees.
Since the enactment of Medicare and Medicaid in 1965, there has been dramatic
growth in the need for nursing homes. The American population aged sixty five and
older is projected to double within the next thirty years.5 In view of this projected
population growth, it is imperative that immediate action be taken to protect
residents of county owned nursing homes.
The first baby boomer will turn sixty five in 2011. According to U.S. Census
Bureau projections, the population of Americans aged sixty five and older will grow
from 35 million to 72 million by 2030.6 This escalation will result in the dramatic
need for and growth of nursing homes. Nationally there are approximately
1,750,000 nursing home residents residing in 16,000 nursing homes.7 In Ohio, there
are approximately 1,400,000 citizens aged sixty five years or older.8 Eighty
thousand of these citizens currently reside in Ohio nursing homes. Of the 989
1

Cramer v. Auglaize Acres, 865 N.E.2d 9 (Ohio 2007).

2

24 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts § 73 (2006). Nursing Homes are defined as “a private
institution that furnishes shelter, feeding, and care for sick, aged, or infirm persons.” Id.
3

Cramer, 865 N.E.2d at 17.

4
Id. at 268-69. OHIO REV. CODE ANN.§ 3721.13 (West 2006) sets out the rights of nursing
homes residents. See infra note 63.
5

WAN HE ET AL., NATIONAL INSTITUTE ON AGING, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS
SPECIAL STUDIES: 65+ IN THE UNITED STATES: 2005, (2005) http://www.census.gov/prod/
2006pubs/p23-209.pdf. Currently, persons sixty five and older represent twelve percent of the
population. Id. Persons sixty five and older are projected to represent 20 percent of the
population by 2030. Id.
6

Id.

7

National Center for Health Statistics Health, United States, 2006, with Chartbook on
Trends in the Health of americans 384 (2006) http://www. cdc.gov/nchs/data/hus/hus06.pdf.
8

UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU, 2005 AMERICAN COMMUNITY SURVEY DATA PROFILE
HIGHLIGHTS: OHIO, (2005), http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/ACSSAFFFacts?_event=&geo
_id=04000US39&_geoContext=01000US%7C04000US39&_street=&_county=&_cityTown=
&_state=04000US39&_zip=&_lang=en&_sse=on&ActiveGeoDiv=geoSelect&_useEV=&pct
xt=fph&pgsl=040&_submenuId=factsheet_1&ds_name=DEC_2000_SAFF&_ci_nbr=null&qr
_name=null&reg=null%3Anull&_keyword=&_industry=. The American Community Survey
provides yearly detailed data. Id
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nursing homes within Ohio, two-thirds are privately owned, with the remainder
owned by the government and nonprofit organizations.9 This dramatic growth in
9

Ohio currently has 54 nursing homes operated by the government. The number of beds
per facility follows the name of the home. Ashtabula County Nursing Home (177), 5740
Dibble Road, Kingsville, OH 44048; Auglaize Acres (142), 13093 Infirmary Road ,
Wapakoneta, OH 45895; Auglaize County Board of MR/DD, 20 E. First Street, New Bremen,
OH 45869; Belmont Metropolitan Housing Authority(78), PO Box 398 100 South Third
Street, Martins Ferry, OH 43935; Butler County Care Facility (121), 1800 Princeton Road ,
Hamilton, OH 45011; Carroll County Home (45), 2202 Kensington Road P.O. Box 365,
Carrollton, OH 44615; Colonial Manor (83), 441 University Drive NE, New Philadelphia,
OH 44663; Coshocton County Memorial Hospital Care Facility (61), 1460 Orange Street,
Coshocton, OH 43812; Country Garden Manor (16); Country View Acres (65), 601 Infirmary
Road, Dayton, OH 45427; Country View Haven (40), R858 County Road 15 P.O. Box 525,
Napoleon, OH 43545; Crawford County Home (Fairview Manor) (90), 1630 East Southern
Avenue , Bucyrus, OH 44820; Cuyahoga County Nursing Home (177), 3305 Franklin
Boulevard , Cleveland, OH 44113; Darke County Home (78), 5105 County Home Road,
Greenville, OH 45331; Dayspring Assisted Living and Care Facility (60), 3220 Olivesburg
Rd., Mansfield, OH 44903; Drake Center (256), 151 West Galbraith Road, Cincinnati, OH
45216; East Lawn Manor - Marion County Home (126), 1422 Mt. Vernon Avenue, Marion,
OH 43302; Elisabeth Severance Prentiss Center (150), 3525 Scranton Road , Cleveland, OH
44109; Erie County Care Facility (160), 3916 East Perkins Avenue, Huron, OH 44839; Fair
Haven Shelby County Home (145), 2901 Fair Road , Sidney, OH 45365; Gables at Green
Pastures (112), 390 Gables Drive, Marysville, OH 43040; Geauga County Home-Pleasant Hill
(36), 13211 Aquilla Road , Chardon, OH 44024; Golden Acres Lorain County Nursing Home
(82), 45999 North Ridge Rd, PO Box 190, Amherst, OH 44001; Greenewood Manor (117),
711 Dayton-Xenia Road , Xenia, OH 45385; Guernsey County Home (40), Country View
Assisted Living 62825 County Home Rd., Lore City, OH 43755; Hardin Hills Health
Center (78), 1211 W. Lima Street , Kenton, OH 43326; Holmes County Home (60), 7260
State Route 83, Holmesville, OH 44630; The Liberty (140), 12350 Bass Lake Road , Chardon,
OH 44024; Lincoln Way Home (50), 17872 Lincoln Hwy., Middle Point, OH 45863; Logan
Acres Care Center (95), 2739 County Road 91, Bellefontaine, OH 43311; Medina County
Home (65), 6144 Wedgewood Road , Medina, OH 44256; Mercer County Home (42), 4871
State Route 29 , Celina, OH 45822; MetroHealth Center for Skilled Nursing Center (320),
4310 Richmond Road, Cleveland, OH 44122; MetroHealth Center for Skilled Nursing Care
(29), 2500 Metro Health Drive, Cleveland, OH 44109; Monroe County Care Center (60),
47045 Moore Ridge Rd, PO Box 352, Woodsfield, OH 43793; Morrow County Hosp. Long
Term Care Facility (38), 651 West Marion Road, Mt. Gilead, OH 43338; Muskingum County
Home (80), 1400 Newark Road , Zanesville, OH 43701; Ohio Veterans Home (427), 3416
Columbus Ave. , Sandusky, OH 44870; Ohio Veterans Home Georgetown (168), 2003
Veterans Blvd., Georgetown, OH 45121; Ohio Veterans Home-Veterans Hall (300), 3416
Columbus Avenue, Sandusky, OH 44870; Ottawa County Riverview Nursing Home (190),
8180 W. State Route 163 , Oak Harbor, OH 43449; Park Health Center (100), 100 Pine Ave ,
St Clairsville, OH 43950; Perry County Home (50), 5550 State Route 37 West , New
Lexington, OH 43764; Putnam Acres Care Center (95), 10170 Road 5-H, R.R. 1, Ottawa, OH
45875; Ridge House (4), 7061 Ridge Rd., Parma, OH 44129; Walter House (4), 4058 Walter
Rd., North Olmstead, OH 44070; Washington County Home (100), 845 County House Lane ,
Marietta, OH 45750; Wayne County Care Center (50), 876 Geyer Chapel Road , Wooster, OH
44691; Wellington Nursing and Rehabilitation Center (99), 2380 State Route 68, PO Box 160
, Urbana, OH 43078; Williams County Hillside Country Living (71), 09-876 County Road 16,
Bryan, OH 43506-1012; Wood Haven Health Care Senior Living (108), 11080 East Gypsy
Lane Road , Bowling Green, OH 43402; Woodlands at Robinson (99), 6831 N. Chestnut St. ,
Ravenna, OH 44266; Wyandot County Nursing Home (100), 7830 North State Highway 199,
Upper Sandusky, OH 43351; York House (4), 7283 York Rd., Parma, OH 44130.
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population and need of quality care requires uniformity in the law so all nursing
home residents are equally protected.
Nursing home residents “are almost entirely dependent upon nursing homes to
ensure the[ir] safety”10 Despite the growing need for nursing homes, studies show
that many nursing homes are understaffed and unable to provide even basic care to
their residents.11 One in every twenty elderly residents in a nursing home suffers
from neglect or abuse.12 Annually there are more than 500,000 incidents.13 The most
common negligence violation is the failure to prevent accidents to residents, “such as
falls that cause broken or fractured bones or skin lacerations.”14 For example, one
resident with dementia and poor vision fell four times within a ten month period.15
The fourth fall was reported as causing no injury.16 However, the resident had
fractured her femur which contributed to her death nine days later.17
However, neglect is only one concern. In a recent study over a two year period, it
was found that one out of every three nursing homes was cited for an abuse
violation.18 These nursing homes were cited for approximately 9,000 violations. Of
these violations, over 2,500 caused harm or serious injury, even placing the resident
in “immediate jeopardy of death.”19 These citations included instances of employees
ignoring signs of or being a participant in “appalling physical, sexual, and verbal
abuse.”20
In an attempt to protect our aging population, the Ohio General Assembly
enacted the Nursing Home Bill of Rights.21 The Act states that “any resident whose
rights under this [act] are violated has a cause of action against any person or home
10

Minority Staff of Special Investigations Division Committee on Government Reform,
107 Cong., Abuse of Residents Is a Major Problem in U.S. Nursing Homes, (
2001)[hereinafter Abuse of Residents] (prepared for Rep. Henry Waxman), available at
http://reform.democrats.house.gov/Documents/20040830113750-34049.pdf.
th

11

Christopher Newton, 90% of Nursing Homes Providing Substandard Care—Federal
Report, SEATTLE TIMES, Feb. 20, 2002, at A1.
12
Martin Ramey, Comment, Putting the Cart Before the Horse: The Need to Reexamine
Damage Caps in California’s Elder Abuse Act, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REVIEW. 599, 602 (2002).
13

Id.

14

Minority Staff of Special Investigations Division Committee on Government Reform,
107th Cong., Many Homes Fail to Meet Federal Standards for Adequate Care, , ( 2001),
available at http://oversight.house.gov/Documents/20040830114240-99423.pdf. Examples of
negligent care include: bed sores and/or infections, choking because resident was given the
incorrect diet, incorrect medicine administered to a resident and negligent supervision of a
nursing home resident that results in a fall with severe injury or death.
15

Id.

16

Id.

17

Id.

18

ABUSE OF RESIDENTS, supra note 10.

19

Id.

20

Id.

21

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3721.10-17 (West 2006).
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committing the violation.”22 However, complete enforcement of the Nursing Home
Bill of Rights is prevented by political subdivision immunity.23
The Ohio Political Subdivision Tort Liability Act confers general immunity on
political subdivisions. Therefore, government owned homes seek to avoid liability
by raising the defenses provided by the Ohio Political Subdivision Tort Liability Act,
despite the resident’s rights under the Nursing Home Bill of Rights. The result is
that residents of government owned nursing homes have inferior remedies for the
tortious acts of a county home’s employees.
II. CRAMER V. AUGLAIZE ACRES: HOW THE OHIO SUPREME COURT APPLIED THE
POLITICAL SUBDIVISION TORT LIABILTY ACT TO THE NURSING HOME BILL OF
RIGHTS
In Cramer v. Auglaize,24the Third District’s holding removed all of the
protections of Ohio’s Nursing Home Bill of Rights from every nursing home resident
who lives in a county owned nursing home. The Appellate court held that operating
a nursing home was a proprietary function.25 Therefore, the county was statutorily
immune from any liability under the Ohio Political Subdivision Tort Liability Act
because (1) the way in which an employee of a nursing home provides medical care
is a discretionary function, and (2) the Nursing Home Bill of Rights does not
expressly impose liability on the employees of the nursing home.26
On appeal,27 the Supreme Court held that the Political Subdivision Act contains
exceptions to immunity that would make the home liable for the negligent or
22

§ 3721.17(I)(1)(a).

23

See generally Adams v. Gables at Green Pastures Nursing Home, No. 14-06-33, 2006
Ohio App. LEXIS 6757 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 26, 2006) (Court affirmed denial of summary
judgment on the basis of section 2744 without considering the Nursing Home Bill of Rights);
Cramer v. Auglaize Acres, 865 N.E.2d 9 (Ohio 2007) (defining how a claim made under the
Nursing Home Bill of Rights can proceed in light of the Political Subdivision Tort Liability
Act).
24

Cramer v. Auglaize Acres, 3d Dist. No. 2-04-39, 2005-Ohio-3609; see supra text
accompanying note 1. The trial court held (1) operation of a county home is a proprietary
function, (2) the nursing home bill of rights expressly imposes liability on the two nurses and
(3) the Ohio Political Subdivision Tort Liability Act does not provide the nurses any immunity
under 2744.03(A)(6)(b). The Third District Court of Appeals held that (1) the nursing home
bill of rights did not expressly impose liability on the nurses, and (2) the decision on how to
administer medical was a discretionary function providing immunity to the employee.
25

See infra text accompanying note 55.

26

Cramer at ¶¶ 40, 51-53.

27

Cramer v. Auglaize Acres, 865 N.E.2d 9 (Ohio 2007); see also Cramer v. Auglaize
Acres, 3d Dist. No. 2-04-39, 2005-Ohio-3609. The trial court held (1) operation of a county
home is a proprietary function, (2) the nursing home bill of rights expressly imposes liability
on the two nurses and (3) the Ohio Political Subdivision Tort Liability Act does not provide
the nurses any immunity under 2744.03(A)(6)(b). The Third District Court of Appeals held
that (1) the nursing home bill of rights did not expressly impose liability on the nurses, and
thus did not create an exception to immunity under R.C. 2744.02(B)(5), and (2) the decision
on how to administer medical was a discretionary function providing immunity to the
employee, under R.C. 2744.03(A)(5).
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intentionally tortious acts of its employees, but the way in which an employee of a
nursing home provides medical care is a discretionary function.28 The end result is
that regardless of Ohio’s Nursing Home Bill of Rights, causes of action brought
against a county owned nursing home cannot proceed on a theory of ordinary
negligence, so long as some discretionary action on the part of the employees
involved is found.29
A. The Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity in Ohio
Sovereign immunity for political subdivisions was judicially created.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court has noted in the past that it can be judicially
abolished.30 Sovereign immunity is based on the English concept that the “King can
do no wrong.” 31 “Sovereign immunity is a legal anachronism which denies recovery
to injured individuals without regard to the municipality's culpability or the
individual's need for compensation.”32 The framers of our Constitution guaranteed
that America would have no King. It is therefore anomalous that political
subdivisions are given the same benefit of immunity:
It is something of an anomaly that the common-law doctrine of sovereign
immunity which is based on the concept that 'the king can do no wrong'
was ever adopted by the American courts." (Footnote omitted.) Further,
the United States Supreme Court has also indicated that there is no
rational justification in American jurisprudence for the English legal
maxim "the King can do no wrong." Specifically, in Langford v. United
States, the court stated, "We do not understand that either in reference to
the government of the United States, or of the several States, or of any of
their officers, the English maxim has an existence in this country." 33

28

Cramer, 865 N.E.2d at 17-18.

29

The Cramer decision also takes an expansive view of when an employee’s actions may
be said to be discretionary.
30

Butler v. Jordan, 750 N.E.2d 554, 565 (Ohio 2001).

31

Id. (stating “in the English feudal system, the lord of the manor was not subject to suit in
his own courts. The king, as highest feudal lord, enjoyed this protection on the theory that no
court was above him. Further, the king was considered the supreme power and was, thus,
infallible. His person was considered sacred, and the law ascribed to him the attribute of
sovereignty. Therefore, it was his personal royal prerogative not to be subjected to suit in his
own courts. Accordingly, the king could do no wrong.”)
32
33

Haas v. Hayslip, 364 N.E.2d 1376, 1382 (Ohio 1977) (Brown, J., dissenting).

Id. at 369; see also Butler, 750 N.E.2d at 559 "Nothing seems more clear than that this
immunity of the King from the jurisdiction of the King's courts was purely personal. How it
came to be applied in the United States of America, where the [royal] prerogative is unknown,
is one of the mysteries of legal evolution. Admitting its application to the sovereign and its
illogical ascription as an attribute of sovereignty generally, it is not easy to appreciate its
application to the United States, where the location of sovereignty--undivided sovereignty, as
orthodox theory demands--is a difficult undertaking. It is beyond doubt that the Executive in
the United States is not historically the sovereign, and the legislature, which is perhaps the
depository of the widest powers, is restrained by constitutional limitations. The federal
government is one of delegated powers and the states are not sovereign, according to the
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The United States Supreme Court has stated that:
the English maxim does not declare that the government, or those who
administer it, can do no wrong; for it is a part of the principle itself that
wrong may be done by the governing power, for which the ministry, for
the time being, is held responsible; and the ministers personally, like our
President, may be impeached; or, if the wrong amounts to a crime, they
may be indicted and tried at law for the offence.34
Prior to the introduction of sovereign immunity in Ohio, municipalities were held
to the same standards for wrongful acts as private individuals.35 In 1854 in City of
Dayton v. Peas, the Ohio Supreme Court judicially created sovereign immunity.36 As
the Ohio courts struggled to set standards, the Ohio Supreme Court introduced the
governmental-proprietary distinction.37 However, the Ohio courts’ attempts to place
the functions of municipalities into these two categories caused “confusion and
unpredictability in the law."38 “[T]he classification of the specific functions of
municipalities has been difficult and frequently lead to absurd and unjust
consequences.”39 Furthermore, "it is impossible to reconcile all the decisions of this
court dealing with the subject of governmental and proprietary functions in relation
to a municipality.”40 This struggle led to the judicial abolishment of sovereign
immunity in Ohio in 1982.41
In 1982, the Ohio Supreme Court in Haverlack v. Portage Homes Inc. abolished
the doctrine of sovereign immunity.42 The Court held that a “municipal corporation,
unless immune by statute, is liable for its negligence in the performance or
nonperformance of its acts.”43 Nonetheless, less than a year later, the Ohio Supreme
Constitution, as demonstrated forcibly by the Civil War and the resulting Amendments. That
brings us to the only remaining alternative, that sovereignty resides in the American electorate
or the people."
34

Langford v. U.S., 101 U.S. 341, 343 (1879).

35

John A. Gleason & Kenneth Van Winkle, Jr., The Ohio Political Subdivision Tort
Liability Act: A Legislative Response To The Judicial Abolishment of Sovereign Immunity, U.
CIN. L. REV. 501, 503 (1986). Prior to 1854, Ohio courts treated municipalities the same as
private individuals when imposing liability. See Hack v. Salem, 189 N.E.2d 857, 862 (Ohio
1963) (“In the early reported American cases it apparently was assumed, without argument
and as a matter of basic justice, that municipal corporations were subject to actions for torts.”)
36

City of Dayton v. Pease, 4 Ohio St. 80, 99-100 (1854).

37

Gleason & Van Winkle, supra note 35, at 506-07.

38

Haverlack v. Portage Homes, Inc., 442 N.E.2d 749,752 (Ohio 1982).

39

Id.

40

Id.

41

Western College of Homeopathic Medicine v. Cleveland, 12 Ohio St. 375, 377-78
(1861) (municipality is liable for wrongful acts while performing a proprietary function and
immune when involved with governmental acts); See, e.g., City of Cincinnati v. Cameron, 33
Ohio St. 336, 367-368 (1878).
42

Haverlack, 442 N.E.2d at 752.

43

Id.
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Court in Enghauser Manufacturing Co. v. Eriksson Engineering Ltd. reintroduced
municipal immunity.44 The Ohio General Assembly quickly followed the Ohio
Courts and passed the Ohio Political Subdivision Tort Liability Act on November 20,
1985.45 This Act confers immunity from civil lawsuits on political subdivisions of
the state.46
B. OHIO POLITICAL SUBDIVISION TORT LIABILITY ACT
Section 2744 of the Ohio Revised Code grants immunity from civil lawsuits to
political subdivisions of the state, subject to a complicated system of rules and
exceptions.47 As set forth below, the Political Subdivision Act sets forth separate
immunities, exceptions, and defenses applicable to the political subdivision itself,
and also distinctly to the employees of the political subdivision.
Since the enactment of the Ohio Political Subdivision Tort Liability Act, the
Ohio Supreme Court and “courts all across the state have been called upon, time and
time again, to unravel what that law provides as applied to a myriad of fact
patterns.”48 Courts, “one after another, have found it necessary, when interpreting
various sections of Ohio Revised Code Chapter 2744, to stretch the statute beyond its
parameters.”49 This occurs because courts have to make “equitable decisions in an
inherently inequitable system.”50
A three tiered system is used to determine whether the political subdivision is
entitled to immunity.51 Under the first tier, it must be determined whether the entity
seeking immunity is a political subdivision, and whether the alleged harm occurred
in connection with a governmental or proprietary function.52 If tier one is satisfied
then the entity is presumed to be immune.53 However, the political subdivision’s

44

Enghauser Mfg. Co. v. Eriksson Eng’g Ltd., 451 N.E.2d 228, 232 (Ohio 1983) (“[N]o
tort action will lie against a municipal corporation for those acts or omissions involving the
exercise of a legislative or judicial function, or the exercise of an executive or planning
function involving the making of a basic policy decision which is characterized by the exercise
of a high degree of official judgment or discretion.”)
45

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2744.01-09 (West 2006).

46

§ 2744.01-09.

47

§ 2744.01-09.

48

Butler v. Jordan, 750 N.E.2d 554, 566 (Ohio 2001).

49

Id.

50

Id. “Courts of appeals all across this state continue to confront fact patterns presenting
claims of sovereign immunity when the results of so finding would be inequitable at best and
disastrous at worst.” Id. “The issue presented, however, is "[w]hat are governmental agencies,
the general public, and now the courts to make of a section of the Ohio Revised Code that first
says 'you're not liable,' then says 'you are liable' and then says 'you're not.'” Hallett v. Stow Bd.
of Educ., 624 N.E.2d 272, 274 (quoting Stuckey v. Trustees of Lawrence Twp. No. CA8806, 1992 WL 214485 (5th Dist. Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 24, 1992) (Milligan, J., dissenting).
51

Cramer, 865 N.E.2d 9,13 (Ohio 2007).

52

Id.

53

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2744.02(A)(1) (West 2006).
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immunity may be removed in the second tier. In the second tier the entity will lose
its immunity if any of the exceptions to liability listed in section 2744.02(B) apply.54
If an exception applies, the political subdivision will be liable unless it can reinstate
its immunity in the third tier. The third tier will reinstate immunity if the political
subdivision can show that a defense listed in section 2744.03 applies.55
Under the Act, a political subdivision means “a municipal corporation, township,
county, school district, or other body corporate and politic responsible for
governmental activities in a geographic area smaller than that of the state.”56 An
employee of a political subdivision is defined as an “officer, agent, employee, or
servant, whether or not compensated or full-time or part-time, who is authorized to
act and is acting within the scope of the officer's, agent's, employee's, or servant's
employment for a political subdivision.”57 The Act defines a governmental function
as a “function that is imposed upon the state as an obligation of sovereignty and that
is performed by a political subdivision voluntarily or pursuant to legislative
requirement; a function that is for the common good of all citizens of the state.”58
The function must be one that “promotes or preserves the public peace, health,
safety, or welfare...[and] involves activities that are not engaged in or not
customarily engaged in by nongovernmental persons.”59 In contrast, a proprietary
function is any non-governmental function involving activities that are customarily
engaged in by nongovernmental persons.60
The Act sets out five specific exceptions to the general immunity granted to
political subdivisions.61 In sum, the political subdivision itself is liable for injuries:
(1) when they are caused by the negligent operation of a motor vehicle, (2) when
they occur in the performance of a proprietary function, (3) when the political
subdivision fails to keep public streets or highways in repair, (4) when the injuries
result from negligent acts occurring in buildings used to perform government
functions, and (5) when liability is expressly imposed by another section of the Ohio
Revised Code.62 Where county owned nursing homes are concerned, it is the second
and fifth of these exceptions that the Cramer court found applicable.
Finally, the political subdivision can reinstate immunity by asserting one of the
defenses set out in the Act.63 Notwithstanding an exception under section
2744.02(B), the political subdivision will be re-immunized if (1) the employee was
54

§ 2744.02(B). See supra text accompanying notes 55-56.

55

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2744.03 (West 2006). See supra text accompanying notes 57-

56

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2744.01(F) (West 2006).

58.

57
58

§ 2744.01(B).
§ 2744.01(C)(1)(a)-(b).

59

§ 2744.01(C)(1)(c). The statute provides a nonexclusive list of governmental functions
at § 2744.01(C)(2)(a)-(u).
60

§ 2744.01(G)(1)(b).

61

§ 2744.02(B)(1)-(5).

62

§ 2744.02(B)(1)-(5).

63

§ 2744.03.
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involved in a judicial or legislative function, (2) the employees conduct was required
by law, (3) the injury occurred “within the discretion of the [political subdivision’s]
employee with respect to policy-making or planning,” (4) the injury occurred while
performing community service, or (5) the injury was the result of the exercise of
judgment or discretion in how to use “equipment, supplies, materials, personnel,
facilities” unless this discretion was made in bad faith, or a reckless manner.64
Where the liability of the individual employees themselves is concerned, the
analysis is different. The three tiered analysis applicable to the political subdivision
itself does not apply.65 When a plaintiff sues an individual employee of a political
subdivision, the analysis begins with R.C. 2744.03(A)(6).66 Ohio law states that an
employee of a political subdivision is liable if (a) his or her acts were “manifestly
outside the scope of the employee’s employment or official responsibilities” (b)
“made with malicious purpose, in bad faith, or in a wanton or reckless manner,” or
(c) liability is expressly imposed by another section of the revised code.67 Therefore,
regardless of any defense to liability, an employee of the political subdivision is
liable if his “acts or omissions were [committed] with malicious purpose, in bad
faith, or in a wanton or reckless manner.”68
C. Nursing Home Bill of Rights
In 1979, the Ohio General Assembly passed the Nursing Home Bill of Rights to
protect the aging population that resides in nursing homes. This statute sets out
thirty two rights for all nursing home residents.69 All potential nursing home
64
Id.; see Kiep v. City of Hamilton, No. CA96-08-158, 1997 WL 264236 (Ohio Ct. App.
May 19, 1997) ( “R.C. 2744.03(A)(5) immunity extends only to the ‘exercise of judgment or
discretion’ of a political subdivision as defined by R.C. 2744.01(F) and not to the actions of
employees of the political subdivision... If R.C. 2744.03(A)(5) immunity was extended in a
broad manner to include subdivision employees, the liability provisions of R.C. 2744.02(B)
would have no force.”); McVey v. City of Cincinnatti, 671 N.E.2d 1288, 1290 (Ohio Ct. App.
1995) (stating immunity under §2744.03(A)(5) does not apply to the negligence of employees
in "the details of carrying out the activity even though there is discretion in making choices.").
65

Cramer, 865 N.E.2d 9, 13 (Ohio 2007).

66

Id.; Section 2744.03(6) provides: In addition to any immunity or defense referred to in
division (A)(7) of this section and in circumstances not covered by that division or sections
3314.07 and 3746.24 of the Revised Code, the employee is immune from liability unless one
of the following applies: (a) the employee's acts or omissions were manifestly outside the
scope of the employee's employment or official responsibilities; (b) the employee's acts or
omissions were with malicious purpose, in bad faith, or in a wanton or reckless manner; (c)
civil liability is expressly imposed upon the employee by a section of the Revised Code. Civil
liability shall not be construed to exist under another section of the Revised Code merely
because that section imposes a responsibility or mandatory duty upon an employee, because
that section provides for a criminal penalty, because of a general authorization in that section
that an employee may sue and be sued, or because the section uses the term "shall" in a
provision pertaining to an employee.
67

§ 2744.03(A)(6)(b); Cramer, 865 N.E.2d at 13.

68

Cramer, 865 N.E.2d at 13. The three tiered analysis used to determine the political
subdivision’s immunity remains independent of whether an individual employee is immune
from liability
69

Section 3721.13 sets out the residents rights. The statute provides:
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(A) The rights of residents of a home shall include, but are not limited to, the following:
(1) The right to a safe and clean living environment…
(2) The right to be free from physical, verbal, mental, and emotional abuse and to be
treated at all times with courtesy, respect, and full recognition of dignity and individuality;
(3) Upon admission and thereafter, the right to adequate and appropriate medical treatment
and nursing care and to other ancillary services that comprise necessary and appropriate care
consistent with the program for which the resident contracted. This care shall be provided
without regard to considerations such as race, color, religion, national origin, age, or source of
payment for care.
(4) The right to have all reasonable requests and inquiries responded to promptly;
(5) The right to have clothes and bed sheets changed as the need arises, to ensure the
resident's comfort or sanitation;
(6) The right to obtain from the home, upon request, the name and any specialty of any
physician or other person responsible for the resident's care or for the coordination of care;
(7) The right, upon request, to be assigned, within the capacity of the home to make the
assignment, to the staff physician of the resident's choice, and the right, in accordance with the
rules and written policies and procedures of the home, to select as the attending physician a
physician who is not on the staff of the home. If the cost of a physician's services is to be met
under a federally supported program, the physician shall meet the federal laws and regulations
governing such services.
(8) The right to participate in decisions that affect the resident's life…
(9) The right to withhold payment for physician visitation if the physician did not visit the
resident;
(10) The right to confidential treatment of personal and medical records…
(11) The right to privacy during medical examination or treatment and in the care of
personal or bodily needs;
(12) The right to refuse to serve as a medical research subject;
(13) The right to be free from physical or chemical restraints or prolonged isolation except
to the minimum extent necessary to protect the resident from injury to self, others, or to
property…
(14) The right to the pharmacist of the resident's choice and the right to receive
pharmaceutical supplies and services at reasonable prices…
(15) The right to exercise all civil rights, unless the resident has been adjudicated
incompetent pursuant to Chapter 2111. of the Revised Code and has not been restored to legal
capacity, as well as the right to the cooperation of the home's administrator in making
arrangements for the exercise of the right to vote;
(16) The right of access to opportunities that enable the resident, at the resident's own
expense or at the expense of a third-party payer, to achieve the resident's fullest potential,
including educational, vocational, social, recreational, and habilitation programs;
(17) The right to consume a reasonable amount of alcoholic beverages at the resident's
own expense…
(18) The right to use tobacco at the resident's own expense under the home's safety rules…
(19) The right to retire and rise in accordance with the resident's reasonable requests, if the
resident does not disturb others or the posted meal schedules…
(20) The right to observe religious obligations and participate in religious activities; the
right to maintain individual and cultural identity; and the right to meet with and participate in
activities of social and community groups at the resident's or the group's initiative;
(21) The right upon reasonable request to private and unrestricted communications with
the resident's family, social worker, and any other person…
(22) The right to assured privacy for visits by the spouse…
(23) The right upon reasonable request to have room doors closed and to have them not
opened without knocking…
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residents are given a copy of these rights and a document explaining the provisions
of the act before entering the home.70 Rights protecting the residents physical health
and safety include: (1) The right to a safe and clean living environment; (2) the right
to be free from physical, verbal, mental, and emotional abuse and to be treated at all
times with courtesy, respect, and full recognition of dignity and individuality; (3) the
right to adequate and appropriate medical treatment and nursing care and to other
ancillary services that comprise necessary and appropriate care; and (4) the right to
have all reasonable requests and inquiries responded to promptly.71
The Act begins by listing definitions necessary to interpret its meaning.72 The
Act then specifies additional definitions relevant to the specific civil cause of action
and other remedies provided.73 A home is defined as a facility that provides housing
to three or more unrelated individuals, who are dependent upon the services of
others, including a nursing home, residential care facility, home for the aging, and a
county home facility.74 This definition was meant to include county owned nursing
homes, whether licensed or not, within the protections of the Nursing Home Bill of
Rights.75

(24) The right to retain and use personal clothing and a reasonable amount of
possessions…
(25) The right to be fully informed, prior to or at the time of admission and during the
resident's stay, in writing, of the basic rate charged by the home, of services available in the
home, and of any additional charges related to such services…
(26) The right of the resident and person paying for the care to examine and receive a bill
at least monthly for the resident's care from the home that itemizes charges not included in the
basic rates;
(27)(a) The right to be free from financial exploitation;(b) The right to manage the
resident's own personal financial affairs, or, if the resident has delegated this responsibility in
writing to the home, to receive upon written request at least a quarterly accounting statement
of financial transactions made on the resident's behalf...
(28) The right of the resident to be allowed unrestricted access to the resident's property on
deposit at reasonable hours, unless requests for access to property on deposit are so persistent,
continuous, and unreasonable that they constitute a nuisance;
(29) The right to receive reasonable notice before the resident's room or roommate is
changed…
(30) The right not to be transferred or discharged from the home unless the transfer is
necessary…
(31) The right to voice grievances and recommend changes in policies and services to the
home's staff, to employees of the department of health, or to other persons not associated with
the operation of the home…
(32) The right to have any significant change in the resident's health status reported to the
resident's sponsor.
70

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3721.12(A)(1)(3)(a)-(c) (West 2006).

71

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3721.13(A)(1)-(4) (West 2006).

72

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3721.01 (West 2006).

73

§ 3721.01(A)(3).

74

§ 3721.01(A).

75

Cramer, 865 N.E.2d 9, 15-16.
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The Bill of Rights provides the resident a remedy for the violation of his or her
enumerated rights. It provides that “any resident whose rights under sections
3721.10 to 3721.17 of the Revised Code are violated has a cause of action against
any person or home committing the violation.76 The patient may obtain injunctive
relief against the violation of his or her rights. Most importantly, the resident may
receive compensatory damages for an injury negligently inflicted by the owner of the
home, or any other person who caused the injury, if the patient demonstrates the
elements of negligence.77
Thus the Ohio Nursing Home Bill of Rights sets forth a cause of action under
which the patient can recover for ordinary negligence.78 The language of the Act, at
section 3721.17(I)(1)(a), makes it clear that this remedy applies equally to the
employees themselves, and to the home that employs them. However, according to
the Cramer court, the Ohio Political Subdivision Tort Liability Act greatly curtails
the legal remedies available to residents of government owned nursing homes.
Currently, a resident of a county owned home can seek relief against the home itself,
but subject to the “discretionary acts” defense set forth at R.C. 2744.03(A)(5). If any
exercise of discretion is found, the aggrieved resident must prove that this discretion
was exercised maliciously, in bad faith, wantonly, or recklessly. 79
The Ohio Supreme Court defines recklessness as:
[t]he actor’s conduct is in reckless disregard of the safety of others if he
does an act or intentionally fails to do an act which it is his duty to the
other to do, knowing or having reason to know of facts which would lead
a reasonable man to realize, not only that his conduct creates an
unreasonable risk of physical harm to another, but also that such risk is
substantially greater than that which is necessary to make his conduct
negligent.80

76

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3721.17(I)(2)(a)-(b) (West 2006).

77

§ 3721.17(I)(2)(a)-(b). “The plaintiff in an action filed under division (I)(1) of this
section may obtain injunctive relief against the violation of the resident's rights. The plaintiff
also may recover compensatory damages based upon a showing, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that the violation of the resident's rights resulted from a negligent act or omission of
the person or home and that the violation was the proximate cause of the resident's injury,
death, or loss to person or property. If compensatory damages are awarded for a violation of
the resident's rights, section 2315.21 of the Revised Code shall apply to an award of punitive
or exemplary damages for the violation. Elements of negligence include (1) Defendant owed
a duty of care to the Plaintiff, (2) the Defendant breached the duty, (3) the Plaintiff sustained
an injury, and (4) there is a causal connection between the Defendant’s action and the
Plaintiff’s injury.
78
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3721.17(I)(1)(a) provides: Any resident whose rights under
section 3721.13 of the Revised Code are violated has a cause of action against any person or
home committing the violation; see footnote 59 for a list of rights under section 3721.13;
Thompson v. McNeill, 559 N.E.2d 705, 708 (Ohio 1990) (stating an act is negligent when “the
actor does not desire to bring about the consequences which follow, nor does he know that
they are substantially certain to occur, or believe that they will).
79
80

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2744.03(A)(5) (West 2006).

Thompson, 559 N.E.2d at 708 (Ohio 1990) (stating an act is negligent when “the actor
does not desire to bring about the consequences which follow, nor does he know that they are

2009]

DISCRETION TO FOLLOW THE LAW

255

Wherever applicable, this heightened requirement is a marked departure from the
protections provided by the Nursing Home Bill of Rights. Moreover, the question of
where “discretion” is found within the meaning of R.C. 2744.03(A)(5) now decides
whether the home itself can be held liable in ordinary negligence. Where there is
discretion, the county owned home will only be liable for its employees’ conduct that
rises to the level of being reckless, or worse.
D. County Nursing Homes
1. What is a County Home?
A county home is a facility owned and operated by the county commissioner.81
County commissioners appoint an administrator, who is responsible for the nursing
home’s operation.82 There are two types of county homes: (1) traditional county
homes and (2) Medicaid/Medicare certified county nursing homes.83 A traditional
county home provides custodial, rest home type care and is not certified to receive
Medicaid or Medicare payments.84 A Medicaid certified county nursing home
provides nursing care and is operated on Medicaid funds.85 A Medicare certified
county home is not subject to licensure, but must meet all state and federal standards
to be certified for Medicaid/Medicare. The differences between a private nursing
home and a county home are: (1) the county home is not licensed, (2) the county
home must comply with Chapter 5155 of the Revised Code, (3) the county home
must be operated by a superintendent appointed by and under the supervision of the
county commissioners, (4) the county home must follow state laws in regard to
payments and benefits of its employees, and (5) the county home may charge private
pay patients less than it charges Medicaid for the same services.86
The Nursing Home Bill of Rights mandates that administrators of “homes”87
furnish every resident with a copy of the rights established under the Nursing Home
Bill of Rights, including a written explanation of the provisions of the act and a copy

substantially certain to occur, or believe that they will); Fabrey v. McDonald Vill. Police
Dep’t, 639 N.E.2d 31(Ohio 1994)(adopting the Thompson reckless definition as the standard
for the Ohio Political Subdivision Tort Liability Act).
81

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5155 (West 2006). The Board of County Commissioners shall
make all contracts for new buildings and for additions to existing buildings necessary for the
county home, and shall prescribe rules for the management and good government of the
home.”
82

Ohio County Commissioners Handbook. Available at http://www.ccao.org/Handbook/
hdbkchap048.htm (last visited Feb. 2, 2007.)
83

Id.

84

Id.

85

Id.

86

Id.; see generally supra note 75 and accompanying text.

87

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3721.01(a)(1)(a)-(b)(ii) (West 2006). A home is defined as a
facility that provides housing to three or more unrelated individuals who are dependent upon
the services of others, including a nursing home, residential care facility, home for the aging,
and a county home facility; see also § 3721.10(A).
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of the individual nursing home’s policies and procedures.88 Therefore, before
residents are admitted into a county home, the home is required to provide the
potential resident with a copy of the rights established under the Nursing Home Bill
of Rights.89 Additionally, a copy of the Nursing Home Bill of Rights must be posted
in every county home.90 The requirements to give residents a copy of the Nursing
Home Bill of Rights as well as post them for everyday reading allows one to
reasonably infer that they are protected by these rights.
2. County Homes Acting as Market Participants
In general, when the state enters the market as a participant, the state’s actions
are treated like those of a private party.91 According to the second tier of the Political
Subdivision Tort Liability Act, when a political subdivision acts like a market
participant it is subject to suit for negligence just as non government market actor
would be.92 In Nice v. Maryland, the court held that when a political subdivision is
exercising a proprietary function they are liable “in the same manner and to the same
extent as a private person under the same circumstances.”93 In Ryll v. Columbus
Fireworks Display, the Ohio Supreme Court held, “the law regarding political
subdivisions is different when the political subdivision is engaged in a proprietary
function.”94 Ohio Revised Code 2744.02(B)(2) states, “political subdivisions are
liable for injury, death, or loss to person or property caused by the negligent
performance of acts by their employees with respect to proprietary functions of the
political subdivisions.”95 Political subdivisions engaged in proprietary functions
acting as market participants should be liable as any private company would be:
The municipal corporation is no more a legal concept than a private
corporation. Both arise by operation of law, both necessarily act through
agents, and both necessarily are going to have agents who at times are
negligent in the performance of their duties. The ordinary rules of liability
88

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3721.12(A)(1)(3)(a)-(c) (West 2006).

89

Ohio County Commissioners Handbook, supra note 76.

90

Id.

91

See Owen v. Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 645-646 (1980)(while in the exercise of
proprietary functions, “the city was held to the same standards of [tort] liability as any private
corporation”); Nice v. Marysville, 82 Ohio App. 3d 109, 117 (Union Ct. App. 1992)(the rule
for tort liability for a municipality engaged in a proprietary function under Ohio’s Political
Subdivision Act is merely a recitation of the common law rule: “the municipality becomes
liable for damages caused by its negligence in this regard in the same manner and to the same
extent as a private person under the same circumstances,”), quoting Doud v. Cincinnati, 87
N.E.2d 243, 246 (Ohio 1949).
92

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2744.02(B)(2) (West 2006).

93

Nice v. Maryland, 611 N.E.2d 468, 473 (Ohio App 3d Dist. 1992), See Ryll v.
Columbus Fireworks Display Co., Inc., 769 N.E.2d 372 (Ohio 2002) (holding that “the law
regarding political subdivision liability is different when the political subdivision is engaged in
a proprietary function.”)
94

Ryll, 769 N.E.2d at 376.

95

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2744.02(B)(2) (West 2006).
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applicable to private corporations should give municipalities all the
protection they require against unreasonable claims.96
There are 989 nursing homes in Ohio. Almost ten percent of these homes are
owned and operated by the government. Operating a nursing home is not imposed
upon the State as an obligation of sovereignty. Moreover, operation of a nursing
home is not done for the common good of all the citizens of Ohio. Finally, the
operation of a nursing home is customarily engaged in by private persons. Profit is a
driving force behind the operation of nursing homes.97 Nursing homes do almost 90
billion dollars of business every year.98 Currently, the majority of the revenue that a
nursing home receives comes from the government and private insurance companies,
not the resident. However, when Ohio counties operate nursing homes, their
residents are without many of the protections of the Nursing Home Bill of Rights.
For example, they cannot receive punitive damages for any injury. It is time to
examine whether counties participating in the nursing home market should be liable
in the same manner, and to the same extent as the other ninety percent of the nursing
home market.
3. The Nursing Home Bill of Rights Expressly Imposes Liability
Section 2744.02(B)(5) of the Ohio Political Subdivision Tort Liability Act states
that “political subdivisions [are] liable for injury, death, or loss to a person or
property when civil liability is expressly imposed upon the political subdivision by a
section of the Revised Code.”99 The Nursing Home Bill of Rights states if a
resident’s rights are violated, the resident has a cause of action “against any person
or home committing the violation.”100 Furthermore, the Act includes a county home
within its definition of a home. Accordingly, if subsection 2744.02(B)(5) applies to
county owned nursing homes, under the three tiered analysis, county owned homes
can be held liable as provided by the Bill of Rights. But, then the analysis would
proceed to the third tier: county homes are re-immunized if they can prove that the
harm was caused by the exercise of discretion.101

96
Hack v. City of Salem, 189 N.E.2d 857, 868 (Ohio 1963); See Greene Cty. Agricultural
Soc. v. Liming, 733 N.E.2d 1141, 1148(Ohio 2000) (“when a political subdivision's acts go
beyond governmental functions (and when it acts in a proprietary nature) there is little
justification for affording immunity to that political subdivision. Having entered into
activities ordinarily reserved to the field of private enterprise, a [political subdivision] should
be held to the same responsibilities and liabilities as are private citizens.")(quoting
Schenkolewski v. Cleveland Metroparks Sys., 426 N.E.2d 784, 788 (Ohio 1981).
97

Eric Bates, The Shame of our Nursing Homes, THE NATION, Mar. 29, 1999, available at
1999 WL 9306974. Medicare and Medicaid funds provide almost 75% of every dollar.
98

Id.

99

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2744.02 (West 2006).

100
101

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3721.17(I)(1)(a) (West 2006).

Cramer v. Auglaize Acres, 3d Dist. No. 2-04-39, 2005-Ohio-3609, at ¶¶ 33-35; OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 2744.03(A)(3) (West 2006). The political subdivision is immune if the “act
by the employee involved that gave rise to the claim of liability was within the discretion of
the employee with respect to policy making, planning, or enforcement powers by virtue of the
duties and responsibilities of the officer or position of the employee”; R.C. 2744.03(A)(5) the
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Therefore, in both the intermediate court of appeals and the Ohio Supreme Court,
a central issue of the Cramer case was whether, and to what extent, the Nursing
Home Bill of Rights expressly imposes liability on county homes, and on their
employees.
E. Cramer’s Application of the Ohio Political Subdivision Tort Liability Act to
Claims Arising Under Ohio’s Nursing Home Bill of Rights.
1. Running a Nursing Home is a Proprietary Function
The Ohio Political Subdivision Tort Liability Act codified certain situations
where a political subdivision will be liable in simple negligence, absent a valid
defense.102 The Act states that a political subdivision is liable for negligence when
the actor is carrying out a proprietary function.103
A proprietary function is one that “promotes or preserves the public peace,
health, safety, or welfare and that involves activities that are customarily engaged in
by nongovernmental persons.”104 In Starling v. Metrohealth Ctr. Skilled Nursing, the
court held that running a nursing home was a proprietary function.105 After Starling,
the nursing home in Cramer was the first to argue on appeal that running a county
home was a governmental function, and this argument was rejected.
Furthermore, there has been only one case outside Ohio where a government
owned nursing home argued its activities were in connection with a governmental
function.106 In Everett v. County of Saginaw, the court unanimously held that “a
county hospital's operation of a skilled nursing care unit did not constitute the
performance of a governmental function.”107 The intermediate court of appeals in
Cramer held that the injury that occurred in the county home was connected with a
proprietary function.108
A governmental function is a function that is “imposed upon the state as an
obligation of sovereignty and that is performed by a political subdivision voluntarily
or pursuant to legislative requirement.”109 Additionally, it is a function that is for the
political subdivision will be immune if the injury resulted from “the exercise of judgment or
discretion in determining whether to acquire, or how to use, equipment, supplies, materials,
personnel, facilities, and other resources unless the judgment or discretion was exercised with
malicious purpose, in bad faith, or in a wanton or reckless manner.”
102

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2744.02 (West 2006).

103

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2744.02(B)(2) (West 2006); See Gleason, supra note 30.

104

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2744.01(G)(1)(b) (West 2006); Ryll,769 N.E.2d at 376.

105

Starling v. Metrohealth Ctr. Skilled Nursing, No. 75554, 1999 WL 685641, at *2 (Ohio
Ct. App. Sept. 2, 1999)(holding that the operation of a nursing home was not considered when
the Ohio Political Subdivision Tort Liability Act was enacted.)
106

Everett, v. County of Saginaw, 333 N.W.2d 301 (Mich Ct. App. 1983).

107

Id. at 302-303 (stating “In determining whether a particular activity constitutes a
governmental function, the focus is on the precise activity giving rise to plaintiff's claim rather
than on the entity's overall or principal operation.”)
108

Cramer v. Auglaize Acres, 3d Dist. No. 2-04-39, 2005-Ohio-3609, at ¶ 34.

109

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2744.01(C)(1)(a) (West 2006).
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“common good of all citizens of the state...that promotes or preserves the public
peace, health, safety, or welfare; that involves activities that are not engaged in or not
customarily engaged in by nongovernmental persons.”110 “If the function does not
meet…[these requirements] and is not specified [as a government] function in R.C.
2744.01(C)(2), it is a proprietary function.111
a. Operating a Nursing Home is Not Imposed Upon the State as an Obligation of
Sovereignty
R.C. 2744.01(C)(1)(a) states a function is governmental “if it is imposed upon the
state as an obligation of sovereignty.”112 Operation of a nursing home is not a duty
imposed on a county by the Department of Human Services.113 In other words, the
government is not required to operate nursing homes by any legislation. Rather, the
operation of county homes is controlled by the board of county commissioners.114
The Starling court stated, “the Revised Code does not indicate that operation of a
nursing home is a duty to the Department of Human Services.”115 When the
legislature enacted R.C. 2744.01(C)(2)(m),116 it did not contemplate immunity for the
operation of a nursing home.117 Accordingly, operating a home is not an obligation of
sovereignty.
b. Running a Nursing Home is Not Done For the Common Good of All Citizens
The nursing home confers a benefit on a small “segment of the population, not
the state as a whole.”118 R.C. 2744.01(C)(1)(b) states a function is governmental if it
is “carried out for the common good of all of the citizens of the State.”119 A nursing
110

§ 2744.01(C)(1)(a)-(c) (West 2006).

111

Starling, No. 75554, 1999 WL 685641, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 2, 1999).

112

§ 2744.01(C)(1)(a) (West 2006).

113

Starling, 1999 WL 685641, at *2. “The county home is controlled by the Board of
County Commissioners, not the Department of Human Services. The operation of a county
home is not within the categories of R.C. 329.04 and 329.05, which statutes list the duties of
the Department of Human Services.” Id. (Citation omitted.) In other words, the operation of a
county nursing home is not listed as a duty of the department of human services. Id.
114

Id. “A courthouse, jail, public comfort station, offices for county officers, and a county
home shall be provided by the board of county commissioners when, in its judgment, any of
them are needed.” OHIO REV CODE ANN. § 307.01(A)(West 2006): See also Cramer, 865
N.E.2d at 15.
115

Starling, 1999 WL 685641, at *2.

116

Section 2744.01(C)(2)(m) provides: “A governmental function includes, the operation
of a job and family services department or agency, including, but not limited to, the provision
of assistance to aged and infirm persons and to persons who are indigent.” See, e.g., OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 329.04-05 (West 2006).
117

Starling, 1999 WL 685641, at * 2.

118

Id. at *1; See generally Blakenship v. Enright, 586 N.E.2d 1176, 1181 (Ohio Ct. App.
1990) (stating proprietary acts are “performed solely for the benefit of the political
subdivision's own citizens, not the citizens of the entire state”).
119

§ 2744.01(C)(1)(b).
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home provides care to those who otherwise cannot take care of themselves. Out of
Ohio’s approximately 11 million residents only a small segment—80,000—reside in
nursing homes.120 Therefore, since running a nursing home provides services to less
than 1% of the population, it is not operated for the common good of all citizens.
c. Operation of a Nursing Home is Customarily Engaged in by Private Persons
It has been argued that the operation of a county home cannot be done by
nongovernmental persons.121 This argument requires one to look at the formal title
of a county home. Even though nongovernmental persons cannot own a county
home, they can operate a nursing home.122 The Political Subdivision Tort Liability
Act “does not define a function as governmental based on the type of entity engaged
in the activities. Rather, the statute looks to the nature of the activities...to determine
whether a function is governmental.”123 Furthermore, because 90% of nursing homes
are privately owned, this is an activity customarily operated by private persons.
In sum, under Ohio law, the operation of a county-owned nursing home is a
proprietary function. Under tier one, political subdivisions are generally immune for
both governmental and proprietary functions, except as set forth at R.C.
2744.02(B).124 Under tier two, set forth specifically at subsection 2744.02(B)(2),
political subdivisions are liable in ordinary negligence for acts committed while
carrying out proprietary functions. The Ohio Third Appellate District in Cramer
found that running a county-owned home is a proprietary function, and therefore the
exception applies.
2. The Bill of Rights Expressly Imposes Liability on County Homes, Within the
Meaning of R.C. 2744.05(B)(5)
Section 2744.02(B)(5) of the Ohio Political Subdivision Tort Liability Act states
that “political subdivisions [are] liable for injury, death, or loss to a person or
property when civil liability is expressly imposed upon the political subdivision by a

120

United States Census Bureau, supra note 8.

121

Cramer v. Auglaize Acres, 3d Dist. No. 2-04-39, 2005-Ohio-3609, at ¶ 31.The county
unsuccessfully argued that § 2744.01(C)(1)(c) applied to unlicensed county homes. Id. It
argued that nongovernmental persons could not operate a county home. See also Everett v.
County of Saginaw, 333 N.W.2d 301, 302-03 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983) (“In determining whether
a particular activity constitutes a governmental function, the focus is on the precise activity
giving rise to plaintiff's claim rather than on the entity's overall or principal operation.”)
122

Cramer, at ¶ 25; see Greene City Agriculture Soc. v. Liming, 733 N.E.2d 1141, 1149
(Ohio). “A central consideration within the structure of R.C. Chapter 2744 is the premise that
some activities of a political subdivision may be governmental functions, while some other
activities are not. Thus, the issue here is not whether holding a county fair is a governmental
function; rather, it is the more specific question of whether conducting the hog show at the
county fair and conducting the investigation into the allegations of irregularity surrounding the
entry of Big Fat in that hog show are governmental functions.” Id. The activity of "conducting
a livestock competition is an activity customarily engaged in by nongovernmental persons."
Id.
123

Cramer, at ¶ 29.

124

OHIO REV. CODE ANN.§ 2744.02(A)(West 2006).
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section of the Revised Code.”125 In Cramer, the Supreme Court rejected the lower
court’s reasoning considering the applicability of R.C. 2744.02(B)(5).126
The Supreme Court clarified that R.C. 2744.02(B)(5) is available as a remedy for
nursing home torts sounding in both negligence and intentional tort.127 This
distinction is important because intentionally tortious conduct on the part of the
employee could not be actionable against the political subdivision in the absence of
liability expressly created by statute. It is also important for the obvious purpose of
clarifying when a statute expressly imposes liability within the meaning of the
Political Subdivision Act.
3. A County Owned Nursing Home Employee’s Decision on How to Provide
Medical Care in a Nursing Home as a Discretionary Function
Under the third tier of the analysis applicable to political subdivisions, the
Political Subdivision Act re-immunizes political subdivisions for negligent
discretionary acts.128 Once an act is found to be discretionary, the governmentalproprietary function is irrelevant.129 Accordingly, a political subdivision is immune
if it is determined that an “act is both proprietary and discretionary.”130 The Act
states,
the political subdivision is immune from liability if the injury, death, or
loss to person or property resulted from the exercise of judgment or
discretion in determining whether to acquire, or how to use, equipment,
supplies, materials, personnel, facilities, and other resources unless the
judgment or discretion was exercised with malicious purpose, in bad faith,
or in a wanton or reckless manner.131
It is well established that in order to determine legislative intent the court must look
examine the language of the statute.132 Courts cannot ignore the plain and
unambiguous language of a statute under the “guise of statutory interpretation, but

125

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2744.02 (West 2006).

126

Cramer v. Auglaize Acres, 865 N.E.2d 9, 14 (Ohio 2007). Cramer also argued that the
exception to political subdivision immunity under R.C. 2744.02(B)(5) applied to the county
appellees because Warder's and Green's actions violated R.C. 3721.17(I)(1). The Third District
characterized this exception as moot and declined to consider it because the county appellees
were already subject to liability under R.C. 2744.02(B)(2) for any negligent acts.
127

Id. (stating, “we do not agree. Unlike sections R.C. 2744.02(B)(1) through (4), R.C.
2744.02(B)(5) is not limited to negligent actions. Therefore, we must also examine whether
the exception to immunity pursuant to R.C. 2744.02(B)(5) applies.”)
128

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2744.03(A)(5)(West 2006); Gleason & Van Winkle, supra
note 30. Black’s law dictionary defines a discretionary act as “a deed involving an exercise of
personal judgment and conscience.”
129

Gleason & Van Winkle, supra note 35.

130

Id.

131

OHIO REV. CODE ANN.§ 2744.03(A)(5)(West 2006).

132

Provident Bank v. Wood, 304 N.E.2d 378, 381 (Ohio 1973).
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must give effect to the words used.”133 Therefore, prior to Cramer, Ohio courts held
that the exercise of judgment or discretion is a defense available to the political
subdivision and “not to the actions of employees of the political subdivision.”134
“Immunity does not apply to the negligence of employees in ‘the details of carrying
out the activity even though there is discretion in making choices.’”135
The intermediate court of appeals in Cramer concluded that a political
subdivision’s employee provision of medical care in a nursing home is a
discretionary function.136 The court of appeals applied the 2744.03(A)(5) defenses
directly to the employees themselves, in addition to the home.137
The Court applied the discretion defense by building on its own prior decision in
Thompson v. Bagley.138 In Thompson, the court held that a gym teacher providing
medical care to a drowning student was a discretionary decision and subject to the
discretionary defense.139 In Thompson, the plaintiffs’ decedent was a fourth grade
student who drowned during an unstructured portion of his swimming class.140
When his teacher saw Christopher Thompson lying motionless on the floor of the
pool, he initially thought Christopher was only pretending.141 The teacher sent three
children into the pool to try to bring Christopher up, with the third one succeeding.142
Even with these facts, the Ohio Third District Court of Appeals reached the
conclusion that the discretionary defense of R.C. 2744.03(A)(5) might apply to the

133

Marcum v. Adkins, No. 93CA17, 1994 WL 116233, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 28,
2004); Erb v. Erb, 747 N.E.2d 230 (Ohio 2001).
134
Kiep v. City of Hamilton, No. CA96-08-158, 1997 WL 264236 (Ohio Ct. App. May 19,
1997) (stating “R.C. 2744.03(A)(5) immunity extends only to the ‘exercise of judgment or
discretion’ of a political subdivision as defined by 2744.01(F) and not to the actions of
employees of the political subdivision. … If R.C. 2744.03(A)(5) immunity was extended in a
broad manner to include subdivision employees, the liability provisions of R.C. 2744.03(B)
would have no force.); see McVey v. City of Cincinnati, 671 N.E.2d 1288, 1290 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1995) (stating that immunity under R.C. 2744.03(A)(5) does not apply to the negligence
of employees in "the details of carrying out the activity even though there is discretion in
making choices"); Hallett v. Stow Bd. of Edn., 624 N.E.2d 272, 274 (Ohio Ct. App. 9 Dist.
1993)(stating the “exceptions to liability found in R.C. 2744.03 must be read more narrowly
than the exceptions to non-liability found in R.C. 2744.02(B) in order for the structure chosen
by the legislature to make sense.”)
135

McVey, 671 N.E.2d at 1290.

136

Cramer v. Auglaize Acres, 3d Dist. No. 2-04-39, 2005-Ohio-3609, at ¶ 40. (Nurses’
“decision regarding how to move Mr. Cramer into bed and their reaction to his subsequent fall
are examples of...discretionary actions.”)
137

Id.

138

Thompson v. Bagley, No. 11-04-12, 2005 WL 940872(Ohio Ct. App. April 25, 2005).

139

Id. at *11.

140

Id. at *1.

141

Id.

142

Id.
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Thompsons’ claims against the school, because the teacher has some discretion as to
how to attend to his drowning student.143
By contrast, the school was not entitled to invoke the same provision, R.C.
2744.03(A)(5), as a defense to the Thompsons’ claims based on the school’s
negligent maintenance or operation of the pool.144 The Third District reasoned that a
provision of the Ohio Administrative Code defined the school’s maintenance and
operational requirements.145 Thompson v. Bagley was one of the principal cases
relied upon by the same appellate district one year later, when the Third District
court decided Cramer.146 However, the fact that the Nursing Home Bill of Rights
enumerates and guarantees more than 30 specific rights, statutorily, did not enter into
the court’s analysis in Cramer.
The purpose of a nursing home is to provide medical care. Nursing home
residents are statutorily guaranteed the right to “adequate and appropriate medical
treatment and nursing care...consistent with the program.” 147 If a political
subdivision employee does not have the discretion to disregard the directives of the
Ohio Administrative Code, it is not clear that political subdivision employees have
the discretion to disregard the directives of the Ohio Revised Code. Courts should
not recognize any “discretion” to deviate from the requirements of statutory law.
In Cramer, the employees followed policy by using a Hoyer lift148 to attempt to
transfer Frank Cramer into his bed. Two employees used the lift.149 The appellant’s
position was that Frank Cramer was dropped because of the nurses’ careless transfer
of the patient. Nothing in the record of the case suggested that the nurses were, at
the moment they dropped Mr. Cramer, making any choice about which way to use
the Hoyer lift.
In the Supreme Court, the appellant, Mr. Cramer’s administrator, argued that the
employees’ discretion ended when they decided to use the Hoyer lift.150 After that
point, contended the appellant, the use of the lift was merely the execution of a
decision already taken, with no act of discretion remaining in the carrying out of this
work. This argument was also advanced in the lower court. The Third District court
143

Id. at *11.

144

Thompson, at *10.

145

Id. at *9-10, citing OHIO ADMIN. CODE ANN. § 3701-31 (2003).

146

Cramer v. Auglaize Acres, 3d Dist. No. 2-04-39, 2005-Ohio-3609.

147

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3721.13(A)(3)(West 2006).

148

A Hoyer lift is a lift-sling apparatus used to transfer patients. See Cramer v. Auglaize
Acres, 865 N.E.2d 9.
149
Brief of Amicus Curiae, Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers Urging Affirmance on behalf
of Plaintiff, Appellant, Cramer v. Auglaize Acres, 865 N.E.2d 9 (Ohio 2007) (hereinafter
Merit Brief for Apppelant); but see Merit Brief of Appellees Auglaize Acres, et al. at 6,
Cramer v. Auglaize Acres, 865 N.E.2d 9 (Ohio 2007) (No. 2005-1629) stating only that Mr.
Cramer “fell forward” in the lift. The Merit Brief of Appellant details the nurses’ notes
initially stating that Mr. Cramer “leaned” forward. A nursing supervisor changed the word
“leaned” to “lunged,” despite not having witnessed the fall. Merit Brief for Appellant, supra
note 149, at 2-3.
150

Merit Brief for Appellant, supra note 149, at 11.
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seemed to differentiate the choice of how to move Mr. Cramer and how to treat his
injury after the fall, from the act of dropping him once the choice was made to use
the Hoyer lift.151 Nonetheless, that court held that the choice to use the lift, their act
of moving him after the fall, and the lack of attention to him after the incident
involved “discretion in determining whether to acquire, or how to use, equipment,
supplies, materials, personnel, facilities, and other resources.”152
Thus, by
considering the employees’ actions before and after the moment of the drop,
discretionary actions were found in a case that appears to arise from a simple drop
from a lift.
The Supreme Court held similarly:
R.C. 2744.03(A)(5) restores a political subdivision's immunity if "the
injury, death, or loss to person or property resulted from the exercise of
judgment or discretion in determining whether to acquire, or how to use,
equipment, supplies, materials, personnel, facilities, and other resources
unless the judgment or discretion was exercised with malicious purpose,
in bad faith, or in a wanton or reckless manner." Cramer argues that as a
matter of law, the defense in R.C. 2744.03(A)(5) is not available to the
county appellees. He concedes that Green and Warder had discretion to
decide whether to use the Hoyer lift to put Frank in bed. But once the
nurses decided to use the lift, Cramer maintains, there was no discretion
left because there is only one method for using it. Cramer also contends
that after Frank fell, the nurses failed to follow Auglaize Acre's policy
regarding falls.
We do not agree that the decision to use the Hoyer lift is the only
discretionary act involved, for the nurses' treatment decisions concerning
Frank are also discretionary. Furthermore, the proper method for using the
Hoyer lift and the issue of whether the nurses properly followed the
home's policy concerning patient falls are also disputed. Because there are
material issues of fact as to whether the nurses acted maliciously, in bad
faith, wantonly, or recklessly, we cannot say as a matter of law that R.C.
2744.03(A)(5) is inapplicable in this case. Resolution of these questions
will be for the fact finder to decide.153
The decision to use the Hoyer lift and the subsequent decisions regarding how to
respond to Mr. Cramer’s fall are distinct from the moment that Mr. Cramer was
dropped. Further, it is not clear from the parties’ briefs in what way the “proper
method for using the Hoyer lift” was disputed.154 Put simply, if a discretionary act is

151

Cramer, at ¶ 40. “[The [nurses’] decision regarding how to move Frank into bed and
their reaction to his subsequent fall are examples of...discretionary actions.” Id. See OHIO REV.
CODE ANN.§ 2744.03(A)(5)(West 2006).
152

Id. at ¶ 42.

153

Cramer v. Auglaize Acres, 865 N.E.2d 9, 17 (Ohio 2007).

154

Id. See, supra note 144, at *17 (“The decision of Appellees’ … regarding how to move
Appellant’s decedent into bed and their reaction to his subsequent fall are clear examples of a
discretionary exercise of judgment.” )
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found among these facts, it is difficult to imagine a set of facts where there is no
employee discretion involved.
Under the Nursing Home Bill of Rights, the fact remains that the statute is
designed to make all negligent acts actionable, not solely those acts that rise to the
level of being reckless or wanton.155 By recognizing that the Nursing Home Bill of
Rights falls within the meaning of R.C. 2744.02(B)(5), the Ohio Supreme Court
corrected an error that was important to rectify. But by then holding that the
discretionary defenses under 2744.03(A)(5) might apply to these facts, the same
court raised the bar for nursing home patients residing in county homes from
ordinary negligence to recklessness. While residents of every other home may hold
providers accountable for negligence, residents of county homes will only be able to
take action for reckless acts, so long as some act of discretion is identified.
To say discretion might be found either in the act of dropping a patient, or in the
failure to determine that the patient had suffered a broken leg until five hours after
his fall, is a strained construction of R.C. 2744.03(A)(5). If Ohio’s Nursing Home
Bill of Rights is intended to ensure anything, it is intended to ensure that medical
care is provided in nursing homes. By finding the possibility of some exercise of
discretion in the employees’ actions, the Ohio Supreme Court took a long step away
from the protections of the Nursing Home Bill of Rights, in regards to nursing home
residents who happen to live in county homes.
4. The Nursing Home Bill of Rights Expressly Imposes Liability On Persons, But
Not Employees
In both the Third Appellate District and the Supreme Court, the Cramer courts
found a distinction between the word “employee” as it appears in Chapter 27, and
“person” as it appears in Chapter 37 of the Revised Code. Under the Supreme
Court’s ruling, this distinction absolves the employees of county homes from all
liability, regardless of the cause of action created in the Bill of Rights against any
“person or home.”156
In the court of appeals, the Third District court reversed the trial court, stating the
Nursing Home Bill of Rights statute does not expressly impose liability upon
employees of political subdivisions.157 The court held that a “statute imposing
general sanctions on everyone rather than a group of specific individuals… is not a
statute that expressly imposes liability upon employees of a political subdivision.”158

155

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3721.17(I)(2)(a)(West 2006). (“The plaintiff also may recover
compensatory damages based upon a showing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the
violation of the resident's rights resulted from a negligent act or omission of the person or
home and that the violation was the proximate cause of the resident's injury, death, or loss to
person or property.”).
156

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3721.17(I)(1)(a)(West 2006).

157
Cramer, at ¶ 52(stating that the NHBOR imposes liability upon ‘homes and all persons
in general, but not employees”).
158

Id.; see also OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2744.01(B)(West 2006) (defining an employee as
an “officer, agent, employee, or servant, whether or not compensated or full-time or part-time,
who is authorized to act and is acting within the scope of the officer's, agent's, employee's, or
servant's employment for a political subdivision”).
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The court relied on its own earlier holding in Thompson.159 In this way, the Cramer
court of appeals distinguished the Ohio Supreme Court’s holding in Campbell v.
Burton, in which the Supreme Court recognized that Ohio’s statute requiring school
personnel to report abuse expressly implied liability under the Political Subdivision
act.160 By contrast, the court of appeals stated the Nursing Home Bill of Rights
imposed liability on all persons in general, but not specifically employees.161
Therefore, the court held that a statute that imposed general sanctions on everyone
rather than a group of specific individuals does not expressly impose liability on
political subdivision employees.162
The Nursing Home Bill of Rights expressly states, “any resident whose
rights...are violated has a cause of action against any person or home committing the
violation.”163 This act sets out thirty five rights of the nursing home resident. Only
persons working for or owning the home are capable of violating these rights.
However, the Ohio Supreme Court holds that Ohio’s Nursing Home Bill of Rights
does not expressly impose liability on the employees of the county nursing home.164
The Nursing Home Bill of Rights is not a general sanction on all persons in
general; it is only applicable to the people who are capable of violating a nursing
home resident’s rights while within the home.165 For instance, Frank Cramer, a
nursing home resident, fell while being assisted into bed by nurses employed by the

159
Cramer, at ¶ 52 (citing Ratcliff v. Darby, No. 02CA2832, 2002 WL 31721942 (Ohio
Ct. App. Dec. 2, 2002) (distinguishing Campbell v. Burton, 750 N.E.2d 539 (2001) as a
“unique and narrow” decision)).
160

Campbell v. Burton, 750 N.E.2d 539 (2001). In this case, parent of a student brought
an action against a peer mediator and the city school board for not reporting known or
suspected abuse as mandated by statute. Id. The Ohio Supreme Court held the statute
mandating the reporting of known or suspected child abuse expressly imposes liability within
meaning of Political Subdivision Tort Liability Act. Id.
161

Cramer, at ¶ 52.

162

Id.

163

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3721.17(I)(1)(a)(West 2006).

164

Cramer v. Auglaize Acres, 865 N.E.2d 9, 14, 16-17 (Ohio 2007). “Any resident whose
rights under sections 3721.10 to 3721.17 of the Revised Code are violated has a cause of
action against any person or home committing the violation." Appellees argue that R.C.
3721.17(I)(1) does not satisfy the requirements of R.C. 2744.02(B)(5) or 2744.03(A)(6)(c) by
expressly imposing liability on either the county appellees or their employees . . . Appellees
contend that R.C. 3721.17(I)(1) is a statute that imposes general sanctions against everyone
rather than against a political subdivision or its employees. The court of appeals determined
that the use of the term "person" in R.C. 3721.17(I)(1) was too general to expressly impose
liability on an employee of a political subdivision. Unlike the term "home," the term "person"
is not defined in the Patients' Bill of Rights. Under R.C. 3721.13 , certain patients' rights--such
as the right to adequate and appropriate medical treatment and nursing care and the right to
communicate with the home's physician and employees in planning treatment or care--involve
the conduct of nursing home employees, but there is no express statement that the employees
of a county nursing home will be liable individually for violations of the Patients' Bill of
Rights.
165

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3721.10-3721.19.
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home.166 Despite being in pain, he was put to bed and not checked upon until five
hours later by another nurse employed by the home. These acts clearly denied Mr.
Cramer adequate medical care as protected by §§ 3721.10-3721.19. The only persons
who could violate Frank Cramer’s right to adequate care were the nurses assigned to
him.
In Campbell, the Ohio Supreme Court held that a statute did expressly impose
liability on persons for the failure to report suspected child abuse.167 The statute at
issue here stated, “No person described in division (A)(1)(b) of this section who is
acting in an official or professional capacity and knows, or has reasonable cause to
suspect abuse or neglect of the child shall fail to immediately report that
knowledge.” Division (A)(1)(b) of this section sets out almost fifty different persons
ranging from an attorney to a dentist.168 This list was required because children
come into contact with a wide variety of treatment providers, other caregivers, and
educators. The intent of the statute was to make all persons who shared a special
relationship with the child accountable for the child’s well-being. The Supreme
Court stated that the Ohio General Assembly enacted this statute to “safeguard
children from abuse.”169 The Court stated only the state and its political subdivisions
can protect children from abuse.
In the same way, nursing home residents “are almost entirely dependent upon
nursing homes to ensure the[ir] safety.”170 In Cramer, the Ohio Supreme Court even
166

Id. at 10.

167

Campbell, 750 N.E.2d at 544.

168

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.42(A)(1)(b)(West 2006). “[A]ny person who is an
attorney; physician, including a hospital intern or resident; dentist; podiatrist; practitioner of a
limited branch of medicine as specified in section 4731.15 of the Revised Code; registered
nurse; licensed practical nurse; visiting nurse; other health care professional; licensed
psychologist; licensed school psychologist; independent marriage and family therapist or
marriage and family therapist; speech pathologist or audiologist; coroner; administrator or
employee of a child day-care center; administrator or employee of a residential camp or child
day camp; administrator or employee of a certified child care agency or other public or private
children services agency; school teacher; school employee; school authority; person engaged
in social work or the practice of professional counseling; agent of a county humane society;
person, other than a cleric, rendering spiritual treatment through prayer in accordance with the
tenets of a well-recognized religion; superintendent, board member, or employee of a county
board of mental retardation; investigative agent contracted with by a county board of mental
retardation; employee of the department of mental retardation and developmental disabilities;
employee of a facility or home that provides respite care in accordance with section 5123.171
of the Revised Code; employee of a home health agency; employee of an entity that provides
homemaker services; a person performing the duties of an assessor pursuant to Chapter 3107
or 5103 of the Revised Code; or third party employed by a public children services agency to
assist in providing child or family related services.”
169
Campbell, 750 N.E.2d at 544 (stating the concern in enacting the statute was for the
protection of children from abuse, not political subdivisions and their employees). “In many
instances, only the state and its political subdivisions can protect children from abuse.
Additionally, we have found that children services agencies must protect children from abuse
and eliminate the source of any such abuse. Thus, it is clear that the concern of the General
Assembly in enacting R.C. 2151.421 was not political subdivisions or their employees, but the
protection of children from abuse and neglect.” Id.
170

ABUSE OF RESIDENTS, supra note 10, at 1.
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cited Campbell as part of its support for finding that R.C. 2744.02(B)(5) applied to
county owned nursing homes.171 However the same reasoning did not apply to R.C.
2744.03(A)(6)(c), which would impose liability on the individual employees.
Later in the very same term, the Ohio Supreme Court repeated the long-standing
and obvious fact that political subdivisions can only act through their employees:
We have held and it is well recognized that a political subdivision acts
through its employees. In Spires v. Lancaster (1986), 28 Ohio St.3d 76, 28
OBR 173 502 N.E.2d 614, we stated, "'It is undeniable that the state can
only act through its employees and officers.'" . . . Because a school district
can act only through its employees, R.C. 2744.03(A)(5) affords a defense
to liability. In this instance, Elston's injury resulted from the judgment or
discretion of the coach in determining how to use equipment or facilities.
No claim is presented suggesting reckless conduct. Thus, the school
district successfully asserted this defense in this instance.172
The Nursing Home Bill of Rights does not place liability on persons in general.173
The rights guaranteed under the act strictly apply to a resident confined within a
nursing home. Therefore, the specific rights by themselves expressly limit who can
be liable. For example, residents have the right to a safe and clean living
environment.174 The responsibility to keep a nursing home safe and clean is limited
to the staff employed there. The resident has the right to have clothes and bed sheets
changed as the need arises, to ensure the resident's comfort or sanitation.175
Individuals in general are not responsible for this. Employees of the home whose job
description mandates personal care of residents are responsible for this. Residents
also have the right to adequate and appropriate medical treatment and nursing care.176
Again, the only persons who can violate this right are the medical personal hired by
the home to care for and treat residents within the home. These rights expressly limit
the group of persons that can be held responsible for violations of a resident’s rights.
The Nursing Home Bill of Rights defines certain rights. It provides that if any of
these rights are violated the resident has a cause of action against the person or home
violating the right.177 In Cramer, both nurses were employees of the county owned
nursing home. Furthermore, prior to this fall, the home had implemented a fall policy
for Mr. Cramer, stating he should not be moved if he fell.178 Mr. Cramer’s right to
“adequate and appropriate” medical treatment was violated when the nurses dropped
171

Cramer v. Auglaize Acres, 865 N.E.2d 9, 16 (Ohio 2007).

172

Elston v. Howland Local Sch., 865 N.E.2d 845, 849-50 (Ohio 2007).

173

Cramer v. Auglaize Acres, 3d Dist. No. 2-04-39, 2005-Ohio-3609, at ¶ 52.

174

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3721.13(A)(1)(West 2006).

175

§ 3721.13(A)(5).

176

§ 3721.13(A)(3).

177

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3721.17(I)(1)(a)(West 2006).

178

Merit Brief for Appellant, supra note 149. “The defendant county home, prior to Frank
Cramer's fall from the Hoyer lift, adopted a "Fall Policy" that was introduced into evidence as
Plaintiffs Exhibit 17. It provided that when Frank's fall and injury occurred that the attending
nurses not move him.” Id.
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him.179 The nurses then moved him, thereby violating his right to adequate and
appropriate care again.
As the same court later recognized in Elston v. Howland Local Schools, a
political subdivision cannot act at all except through its employees.180 When a
political subdivision runs a home, its employees carry out the work. The Ohio
Supreme Court’s conclusion that Mr. Cramer’s nurses, as political subdivision
employees, are not “persons” within the meaning of the Nursing Home Bill of Rights
is unsupportable.
5. Employees of a Political Subdivision Are Liable Under 2744.03(A)(6)(b) for
Reckless Actions
The immunities and liabilities of political subdivisions and their employees are
specified in different sections of the Political Subdivision Act.
Section
2744.03(A)(6)(b) sets out specific situations where an employee’s immunity will be
assessed, without regard to the three-tiered analysis applicable to the subdivision
itself.181 Ultimately an employee will be liable if his actions were undertaken with
malicious purpose, in bad faith, or in a wanton or reckless manner.182 Malicious
purpose is defined as a willful and intentional act designed to cause injury.183 Bad
faith means “a dishonest purpose, moral obliquity, [and] conscious wrongdoing.”184
In other words, this means “breach of a known duty through some ulterior motive or
ill will partaking of the nature of fraud. Wanton misconduct is established where a
person fails to exercise any care whatsoever.”185 Recklessness exists where a person
“knowingly and unreasonably opt[s] for a course of conduct that entail[s] a
substantially greater…risk than the available alternatives”186 Because these levels of
scienter are set forth in the disjunctive, recklessness is the lowest standard to
demonstrate liability. Thus as a general rule, political subdivision employees are
liable in their individual capacities so long as their conduct is adjudged to be, at a
minimum, reckless.
However, the Supreme Court apparently disregarded this aspect of the Third
District’s holding entirely, when the Court stated categorically, “[t]hus, Cramer has
no cause of action against the nurses under the Patients’ Bill of Rights.”187 The court
made this statement concerning only R.C. 2744.03(A)(6)(c), which is the section
imposing liability directly on employees when another section of the Revised Code
prescribes it. Based on the person/employee distinction described above, the
Supreme Court agreed with the Third District Court, and found that subsection
179

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3721.13(A)(3)(West 2006).

180

Elston v. Howland Local Sch., 865 N.E.2d 845, 849-50 (Ohio 2007).

181

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2744.03(A)(6)(b)(West 2006).

182

Cramer v. Auglaize Acres, 3d Dist. No. 2-04-39, 2005-Ohio-3609, at ¶ 41.
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Id.

184

Id.

185

Id.
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Ewolski v. City of Brunswick, 287 F.3d 492, 515 (6th Cir. 2002).

187

Cramer v. Auglaize Acres, 865 N.E.2d 9, 17 (Ohio 2007).
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(A)(6)(c) does not apply.188 The Supreme Court’s opinion made no reference at all to
the (A)(6)(b) subsection, which separately imposes liability on employees for any
conduct arising to the level of recklessness, or worse. The Supreme Court’s
categorical statement that “Cramer has no cause of action against the nurses under
the Patients’ Bill of Rights,” is contrary to the plain language of the Bill of Rights,
the Political Subdivision Act, and the lower court’s holding in Cramer.
Employees’ immunity is only assessed under section 2744.03(A)(6).189 Whether
the nurses were acting within any discretion is not at issue under this portion of the
Political Subdivision act.
Section 2744.03 clearly states that a political
subdivision—not the employee-- will be immune from a liability arising out of
discretionary act.
The Supreme Court in Cramer correctly concluded that there was a genuine issue
of material fact as to whether the nurses “acted maliciously, in bad faith, wantonly,
or recklessly” within the meaning of R.C. 2744.03(A)(5).190 But, as set forth above,
the only reason this standard was applied was to set the parameters for the
“discretionary acts” defense available to the political subdivision. The Ohio
Supreme Court had facts before it suggesting liability under R.C. 2744.03(A)(6)(b),
but simply overlooked this portion of the statute. The Ohio Supreme Court’s ruling
will likely breed confusion now that it has stated categorically that there is no cause
of action against employees of a county home.
6. Adams v. Gables: the Cramer Court Retreats From the Broad Application of the
Discretionary Defense
Only a year prior to Adams, the Cramer court was quick to apply §
2744.03(A)(5) to the employees of the political subdivision without mentioning any
policy governing how patients were to be transferred.191 However in Adams, with
Cramer pending in the Ohio Supreme Court, the Third District court appeared more
cautious. The court first set out the conflicting arguments for the applicability of the
discretionary defense:
The Gables claims that the defense in R.C. 2744.03(A)(5) applies, which
provides: The political subdivision is immune from liability if the injury,
188
Id. Note that the Supreme Court erroneously cited only subsection 2744.03(A)(6)(a),
which imposes liability on employees for tortious acts that are manifestly outside the scope of
their employment. It is otherwise clear from the context of paragraph 32 that the Court was
speaking of the (c) subsection, governing liability imposed by other sections of the revised
code.
189

Id. at 13; see also Cramer v. Auglaize Acres, 3d Dist. No. 2-04-39, 2005-Ohio-3609.

190

Id. at 17; “After reviewing the entire record, we find that there is a material issue of fact
concerning whether Green and Warder acted maliciously, in bad faith, wantonly, or recklessly.
Cramer's complaint and the affidavit of at least one expert allege that Green and Warder
purposefully concealed Frank's injury and falsified his medical records in an effort to cover up
their negligence. The affidavit also alleges that Green and Warder's intentional actions caused
Frank to suffer undue pain for approximately five hours. Moreover, there is at least some
circumstantial evidence supporting these allegations. Thus, a material issue of fact remains
concerning whether Green and Warder's actions rose to the level of malice, bad faith,
wantonness, or recklessness.”
191

Cramer, at ¶ 41.
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death, or loss to persons or property resulted from the exercise of
judgment or discretion in determining whether to acquire, or how to use,
equipment, supplies, materials, personnel, facilities, and other resources
unless the judgment or discretion was exercised with malicious purpose,
in bad faith, or in a wanton or reckless manner. Adams responds that,
under R.C. 2744.03(A)(5), immunity for discretionary decisions only
applies to political subdivisions themselves and not to individual
employees. Thus, Adams argues that The Gables' employees were
required to implement an acute fall care plan pursuant to The Gables' own
discretionary policy, and failure by The Gables' employees to do so does
not fit within the discretion encompassed by the section R.C.
2744.03(A)(5) defense.192
The court then avoided the issue of whether an employee has any discretion to go
against her employer’s policies by stating, “the record provides little evidence that a
[fall care plan] policy existed.193 From this statement the court held that a decision
“regarding an exercise of discretion is… premature.”194 However, documentation of
Nannie Martin’s fall assessment was admitted into evidence and stated an acute fall
care plan was to be implemented.195 For now, it is an open question whether and to
what extent providing medical care in a nursing home remains a discretionary
function.
In the Supreme Court’s opinion in Cramer, the court was willing to entertain the
possibility of discretion being found in the acts of dropping a patient, and failing to
diagnose his broken leg for five hours. By contrast, in Adams, decided December
26, 2006, the same appellate court that decided Cramer sidestepped its own earlier
holding.196 In Adams, Nannie Martin was determined to be at high risk for falling.197
This determination required that an “Acute Fall Care Plan” be initiated.198 The court
affirmed the denial of summary judgment to the county nursing home because the
home had not produced any evidence about its policies or procedures while seeking
summary judgment. Therefore in Adams, the Third Appellate District needed to see
more about the policies applicable to employee discretion. This attention to the
home’s specific procedures may indicate a retreat from the same court’s willingness
to find discretion in Cramer.

192

Adams v. Gables at Green Pastures Nursing Home, No. 14-06-33, 2006 Ohio App.
LEXIS 6757, at *10 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 26, 2006).
193

Id. at *10-11.

194

Id. at *11.

195

Id. at 4; based on the patient’s “Fall Risk/Alarm Assessment,” the plaintiff’s nursing
expert averred that the nursing home failed to implement Nannie Martin’s acute fall care plan.
196

Adams, 2006 Ohio App. LEXIS 6757.

197

Id. at *3-4.

198

Id. at *4.
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III. CAN THE GOVERNMENT OPERATE A NURSING HOME WITHOUT CREATING A
CONFLICT OF POLICY?
A. The Nursing Home Bill of Rights Allows Punitive Damages, the Ohio Political
Subdivision Tort Liability Act Does Not
Under the Nursing Home Bill of Rights, if compensatory damages are awarded
for a violation of the resident's rights, section 2315.21 of the Revised Code applies to
award plaintiff punitive damages.199 The Bill of Rights specifically provides for
punitive damages as a means of enforcing the protections enacted in the Bill. But
under the Political Subdivision Tort Liability Act, the plaintiff may only recover his
or her actual losses incurred through compensatory damages.200 The Political
Subdivision Act does not allow an injured plaintiff to recover any punitive
damages.201 The Act also caps the damages available for “non-actual” loss, except
for wrongful death claimants.202
199

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3721.17(I)(2)(b)(West 2006).

200

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2744.05(C)(1)(West 2006) provides: “There shall not be any
limitation on compensatory damages that represent the actual loss of the person who is
awarded the damages.” §2744.05(c)(2)(a)-(f) provides:
the actual loss of the person who is awarded the damages includes all of the
following:(a) all wages, salaries, or other compensation lost by the person injured as a
result of the injury, including wages, salaries, or other compensation lost as of the date
of a judgment and future expected lost earnings of the person injured; (b) All
expenditures of the person injured or another person on behalf of the person injured
for medical care or treatment, for rehabilitation services, or for other care, treatment,
services, products, or accommodations that were necessary because of the injury;(c)
All expenditures to be incurred in the future, as determined by the court, by the person
injured or another person on behalf of the person injured for medical care or treatment,
for rehabilitation services, or for other care, treatment, services, products, or
accommodations that will be necessary because of the injury; (d) All expenditures of a
person whose property was injured or destroyed or of another person on behalf of the
person whose property was injured or destroyed in order to repair or replace the
property that was injured or destroyed; (e) All expenditures of the person injured or of
the person whose property was injured or destroyed or of another person on behalf of
the person injured or of the person whose property was injured or destroyed in relation
to the actual preparation or presentation of the claim involved; (f) Any other
expenditures of the person injured or of the person whose property was injured or
destroyed or of another person on behalf of the person injured or of the person whose
property was injured or destroyed that the court determines represent an actual loss
experienced because of the personal or property injury or property loss.
201
§ 2744.05(A). “Notwithstanding any other provisions of the Revised Code or rules of a
court to the contrary, in an action against a political subdivision to recover damages for injury,
death, or loss to person or property caused by an act or omission in connection with a
governmental or proprietary function, punitive or exemplary damages shall not be awarded.”
Id.
202

§ 2744.05 (C)(1).
There shall not be any limitation on compensatory damages that represent the actual
loss of the person who is awarded the damages. However, except in wrongful death
actions brought pursuant to Chapter 2125. of the Revised Code, damages that arise
from the same cause of action, transaction or occurrence, or series of transactions or
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B. Punitive Damages Make the County Tax Payers Ultimately Responsible
The policy behind the statutory refusal to permit awards of punitive damages
against political subdivisions is well-established. Any award of punitive damages
against a county, township, or city is contrary to public policy because the burden of
a punitive damages award falls upon the taxpayers of the county.203 The award of
punitive damages against a county would result in the citizens being punished for the
acts of public officials.204 Punitive damages “involve a blending of the interests of
society and those of [aggrieved individuals].”205 The purpose of punitive damages is
not to compensate the injured party, but to punish and deter certain conduct.206
Compensatory damages do not create the same dilemma. The municipality,
which is able to spread the burden of the cost of an injury among its taxpaying
residents, “is in a much better position… than the injured individual.”207 In Haas v.
Hayslip, the Ohio Supreme Court stated,
if the burden of damages must be imposed, it is much fairer that it be
imposed on a municipality than on the victim… [C]ities and states are
active and virile creatures, capable of inflicting real harm and their civil
liability should be co-extensive...if the city operates or maintains injuryinducing activities or conditions, the harm thus caused should be viewed
as a part of the normal and proper cost of public administration and not as
a diversion of public funds. The city is a far better loss-distributing agency
that the innocent and injured victim.208
County owned nursing homes therefore cannot be subjected to this
remedy made available to residents of privately owned homes. The result
is that the deterrence created by an award of punitive damages—as well as
by the possibility of an award of punitive damages—is not applicable to
county owned nursing homes.

occurrences and that do not represent the actual loss of the person who is awarded the
damages shall not exceed two hundred fifty thousand dollars in favor of any one
person. The limitation on damages that do not represent the actual loss of the person
who is awarded the damages provided in this division does not apply to court costs
that are awarded to a plaintiff, or to interest on a judgment rendered in favor of a
plaintiff, in an action against a political subdivision.
203

Kline v. Kansas City Fire Dept., 175 F.3d 660, 669-70 (8th Cir. 1999) (stating that
because the burden of a punitive damages award against a municipality ultimately falls on the
taxpayers, and thus will fail to deter future harmful activity by the municipality itself, punitive
damages are not usually recoverable against a municipality.)
204

Id.

205

25 C.J.S. Damages § 195 (2006).

206

Id.; see BMW v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 568 (1996) (“[P]unitive damages may
properly be imposed to further State's legitimate interests in punishing unlawful conduct and
deterring its repetition.”)
207

Hack v. City of Salem, 189 N.E.2d 857, 868 (Ohio 1963).

208

Haas v. Hayslip, 364 N.E.2d 1376, 1382 (Ohio 1977)(Braum, J., dissenting).
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IV. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS TO PROTECT RESIDENTS OF COUNTY OWNED NURSING
HOMES
A. Amend the Nursing Home Bill of Rights to Clearly Impose Liability on Employees
The Nursing Home Bill of Rights expressly imposes liability on any person or
home violating a resident’s rights. The first section of the Nursing Home Bill of
Rights defines the words of the statute.209 The statute defines home as “an
institution, residence, or facility that provides, for a period of more than twenty-four
hours accommodations to three or more unrelated individuals who are dependent
upon the services of others, including a nursing home, residential care facility, home
for the aging, and a veterans' home.”210 Home also means “[a] county home or
district home that is or has been licensed as a residential care facility.”211 However,
the word person is not defined or limited.212
To impose liability on the home’s employee’s, Ohio’s General Assembly could
make one of three changes to the statute to impose liability on all employees and
nursing homes. First, the legislature could add the term “person” to the list of
definitions.213 Here the General Assembly could specifically name what persons
would be liable for violations of the resident’s rights. Second, the legislature could
replace the word person with “employee of the home.” This simple change in words
would clearly impose liability on all employees of the nursing home, without
changing the apparent intent of the statute. Neither the courts nor the parties to
actions against nursing homes or their employees would then be required to
distinguish the rights and remedies available against county home and the persons
who work in them from those of any other nursing home.
B. Ohio Can Waive its Immunity from Liability of All County Owned Nursing Homes
Section 2743.02(B) of the Ohio revised Code waives political subdivision
immunity for all hospitals214 owned or operated by one or more political subdivisions

209

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3721.01(A)(1) (West 2006).

210

§ 3721.01(A)(1)(a).

211

§ 3721.01(A)(1)(a)(b)(ii).

212

See e.g. Campbell v. Burton,750 N.E.2d 539 (Ohio2001)(superseded by statute).

213

Cramer v. Auglaize Acres, 865 N.E.2d 9, 16 (Ohio 2007) (finding that while the Bill of
Rights applied to impose liability on the subdivision because “home” was defined, the same
did not hold true for employees because “person” was not defined in the Bill of Rights.
214

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3727.01(C)(2) (West 2006) provides:
As used in this chapter, "hospital" means an institution classified as a hospital under
section 3701.07 of the Revised Code in which are provided to inpatients diagnostic,
medical, surgical, obstetrical, psychiatric, or rehabilitation care for a continuous period
longer than twenty-four hours or a hospital operated by a health maintenance
organization. "Hospital" does not include a facility licensed under Chapter 3721. of
the Revised Code, a health care facility operated by the department of mental health or
the department of mental retardation and developmental disabilities, a health
maintenance organization that does not operate a hospital, the office of any private
licensed health care professional, whether organized for individual or group practice,
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and permits them to be sued.215 This statute allows the political subdivision’s liability
to be determined by the court. The court will apply the same rules and law that is
applicable to a private hospital.
A nursing home is not considered a hospital under Ohio Revised Code §
However, in the same way the state could easily waive its
3727.01(C)(2).216
immunity from all nursing homes. This would allow all resident to sue county
owned nursing homes and their employees when their rights were violated.
Accordingly, all residents of nursing homes would be protected under the same laws.
C. County Homes Should Disclose the Limited Applicability of the Nursing Home
Bill of Rights
The simplest way to move toward the equal protection of all citizens of Ohio
living in nursing homes is through disclosure. There are fifty-four government
homes in the state of Ohio.217 These homes offer over five thousand beds for Ohio
residents.218 Only twenty seven of these homes identify themselves as county homes
in their name. Many homes such as Wood Haven Health Care Senior Living and
Putnam Acres Care Center give no indication that they are operated by the county.
Homes that do not identify themselves as county operated must disclose this
information to incoming residents.
Currently, the Nursing Home Bill of Rights mandates that administrators of
“homes”219 furnish every resident with a copy of the rights established under the
Nursing Home Bill of Rights including a written explanation of the provisions of the
act and a copy of the individual nursing home’s policies and procedures.220 When a
home provides a resident with a copy of his rights and then an explanation of the
or a clinic that provides ambulatory patient services and where patients are not
regularly admitted as inpatients.
215
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3743.02(B)(West 2006) provides:
The state hereby waives the immunity from liability of all hospitals owned or operated
by one or more political subdivisions and consents for them to be sued, and to have
their liability determined, in the court of common pleas, in accordance with the same
rules of law applicable to suits between private parties, subject to the limitations set
forth in this chapter. This division is also applicable to hospitals owned or operated by
political subdivisions which have been determined by the supreme court to be subject
to suit prior to July 28, 1975.
216
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3727.01(C)(2)(West 2006). “Hospital does not include a
facility licensed under Chapter 3721 of the Revised Code.”
217

See supra note 9.

218

State of Ohio, Long Term Care Consumer Guide [hereinafter Consumer Guide].
http://www.ltc.ohio.gov/consumer/compoundsearchresults.asp (last visited Feb. 2, 2007). This
comprehensive guide sets out 970 of Ohio’s nursing homes. The guide offers up to date
information on the homes including the most recent inspection report. Id. The guide does not
differentiate between government and privately owned homes. Id.
219

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3721.01(a)(1)(a)-(b)(ii)(West 2006). A home is defined “a
facility that provides… [housing] to three or more unrelated individuals who are dependent
upon the services of others, including a nursing home, residential care facility, home for the
aging,” and a county home facility.
220

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3721.12(A)(1)(3)(a)-(c)(West 2006).
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provisions of the act, a reasonable person would assume he had these protections.
However, where any act of discretion can be found, residents of county homes are
not protected from negligent acts or omissions. Until a change is made to protect all
nursing home residents, those who are unprotected must be correctly informed.221
Upon admission, all county home residents would be required to read a statement
telling them they give up the protections of the Nursing Home Bill of Rights by
residing in the home. Furthermore, they must sign a statement acknowledging that if
the county home violates the resident’s rights, he or she will only be able to seek
compensatory damages, and not the punitive damages available to residents of
privately owned homes. Without these disclosures, our aging population has no idea
they are not protected to the same extent as those living in homes not owned by a
county. Unfortunately, until these changes occur, most residents or their families
will only find out the negative effect of Cramer after a violation of their rights has
occurred.
The Ohio legislature passed Bill 403 during the 123rd General Assembly session
in 2000.222 This law required that Ohio create an Ohio Long-Term Care Consumer
Guide. The Ohio Department of Aging developed the guide. Under Ohio law,
nursing homes are not required to participate. However, current 2006 inspection
reports are listed for 970 homes.223 The site offers information on satisfaction,
services offered, daily prices, and ownership, to name a few.224 However, the
ownership section does not differentiate between government and privately owned
homes. Under the current law, this site could offer a valuable service by adding a
government/private ownership section. Additionally, the site should highlight those
homes that are shielded by government immunity when violating a resident’s rights.
V. CONCLUSION
The application of the Ohio Political Subdivision Tort liability act to the rights
defined in the Nursing Home Bill of Rights is a tangled web. The Ohio Supreme
Court has opened the door for the “discretion” defense to apply broadly to the
provision of medical care in a nursing home. The effect is that if any discretionary
action is found, county homes are not liable for ordinary negligence as provided by
the Nursing Home Bill of Rights. Instead, county homes could only be liable for
their employees’ reckless misconduct. The employees might not be liable
individually at all.
All nursing homes that violate a resident’s codified rights should be held
accountable. This will only happen when all nursing home residents can seek
damages for abuse and neglect. Unfortunately, under Ohio law, many residents are
unprotected because of the simple happenstance that their home is owned and
operated by a political subdivision. Residents enter nursing homes with a sense of
security regarding certain rights. But ten percent of those residents are living under a

221

See Consumer Guide available at which could be used to inform potential residents.

222

GAIL PATRY ET.AL., NURSING HOME RESIDENT SATISFACTION: AN OVERVIEW OF PUBLIC
REPORTING (June 2003) (prepared for Rhode Island Department of Health), at
http://www.health.state.ri.us/chic/performance/quality/quality16.pdf.
223

Consumer Guide, supra note 210.

224

Id.
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false sense of security. Most will only find out they are unprotected when the
damage is done and it is too late.
The elderly have become the fastest growing segment of the population. With
over one and a half million resident over the age of sixty five, immediate action is
required. Ohio enacted the Nursing Home Bill of rights to protect all nursing home
residents—not just those fortunate enough to afford the private homes. Ohio’s
elderly population deserves to be treated fairly.
The disparate treatment meted out to residents of county owned homes opens the
Political Subdivision Act to another challenge: equal protection. The law formerly
recognized that government actors taking part in the marketplace like any other
participant were liable “in the same manner, and to the same extent” as any other
participant. Under Cramer, while residents of non-county owned homes can sue for
ordinary negligence, county owned homes can be found immune for the same
conduct. There is no justification for this disparate treatment.

